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THE QUEST TO REPROGRAM CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A
HERMENEUTICAL RESPONSE TO JACK BALKIN'S THEORY
OF IDEOLOGY AND CRITIQUE
FRANCIS J. MOOTZ

III*

INTRODUCTION

Critical theory has lost the self-assurance that defined the heady
days of Marxist economics and Freudian psychoanalysis. In his
famous debate with Hans-Georg Gadamer thirty years ago, Jurgen
Habermas argued that critical theory was a necessary corrective to
the quiescence and conventionalism that followed from Gadamer's
hermeneutic perspective.
As the 1960s unfolded, the second
generation of the Frankfurt School appeared poised to bring
sophisticated techniques of social criticism to bear on the emerging
postindustrialist system of global capitalism. But the promise of
critical theory failed to materialize. Today, Habermas plays the role
of the aging lion who refuses to accept the postmodern verdict that
his theoretical roar simply has no practical bite. Sophisticated
philosophy is just another narrative, the postmodernists argue, and
the dream of critical theory is just a fantasy. Locked in the grip of this
impasse, theorists are now searching for a new approach to critical
theory.
Against this backdrop, Jack Balkin has written an important
book that attempts to define critical theory in our postmodern age.
Balkin's previous legal scholarship invoked postmodern and
deconstructive themes, but it also invoked the critical legal studies
tradition in America, which has adopted (loosely) the goals and
methods of the Frankfurt School in the context of legal theory.' In
* Professor of Law, Penn State University, Dickinson School of Law. This Article grew
out of my introductory comments as chair of a panel at the Second Annual Meeting of the
Working Group on Law, Culture, and the Humanities, Wake Forest University School of Law,
March 12-14, 1999. I would like to thank George Taylor for presenting a very interesting and
challenging critique of Balkin's book, the audience for their probing comments and questions,
and Jack Balkin for his spirited participation. I benefited from comments on an earlier draft
that were offered generously by Step Feldman, Jim Gardner, and George Taylor.
1. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743
(1987) (using Derrida's deconstruction to further the goals of critical legal theory).
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Cultural Software: A Theory of Ideology,2 Balkin moves beyond the
specific realm of legal philosophy and presents a comprehensive
theory about the nature and genesis of ideology and the role of
critical theory in responding to the effects of ideology. Balkin argues
that using the metaphor of "cultural software" to describe the "tools"
of understanding and evaluation opens a pathway for moving beyond
entrenched positions and delivering a new and more productive
account of ideology and the prospects for critical theory. In short,
Balkin proposes to demonstrate that critical theory remains possible
in a postmodern world.
Although Balkin displays an impressive grasp of numerous
currents in contemporary thought, I will argue that the guiding
metaphor of "cultural software" proves unhelpful in gathering these
currents into a better conception of critical theory. Balkin uses
Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics as his foil at critical junctures
of his account, but his impoverished reading of Gadamer's philosophy
leads him to underestimate the force of Gadamer's hermeneutical
challenge to critical theory. My thesis is that the productive aspects of
Balkin's theory in fact are central to Gadamer's philosophical
hermeneutics, and that the unproductive elements in Balkin's theory
are best explained by his deviation from Gadamer's hermeneutical
approach. Balkin's theory of ideology and critique delivers some
important insights, but it must be recast in terms of the hermeneutical
tradition that he unsuccessfully attempts to surpass.
It would be ironic if I claimed to judge Balkin from a fixed and
insular conception of philosophical hermeneutics, given the centrality
of dialogue to Gadamer's philosophy of human understanding. I
concede at the outset that the role of critical theory has too often
been suppressed in philosophical hermeneutics, leading to the kinds
of misunderstandings that appear in Balkin's book. In the foreword
to the second edition of Truth and Method, Gadamer acknowledged
that his focus on hermeneutic universalism displayed a certain "onesidedness" that had tended to obscure that "it is still part of the
nature of man to be able to break with tradition, to criticize and
dissolve it," but Gadamer insisted that his one-sidedness embodied
the "truth of a corrective" in response to the intellectual hubris of the
modern age of instrumental reason. 3 The intellectual tide has clearly
2. J.M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY (1998).
3. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, at xxxvii (Joel Weinsheimer &
Donald G. Marshall trans., Crossroad 2d rev. ed. 1989) (1960).
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reversed in the intervening years, however. Postmodernism reflects
the most radical elements of a more broad-based rejection of the
naive scientific consciousness that was Gadamer's original target. As
a result, now it is necessary to draw from Gadamer's hermeneutical
philosophy a different "corrective" that can overcome the neglect of
man's critical "nature" that currently reigns. In the course of
identifying the inadequacies of Balkin's account, then, philosophical
hermeneutics will emerge with new accents and themes. Balkin's
provocation helps to reveal that the positive contribution that
philosophical hermeneutics makes to the critique of ideology is
lodged precisely within its longstanding arguments against
overreaching by critical theorists such as Habermas.
In Part I, I unpack Balkin's metaphor of "cultural software" and
argue that he shares substantial common ground with Gadamer's
philosophical hermeneutics, notwithstanding his insistence on
drawing a sharp distinction. However, I contend that Gadamer
employs more fruitful metaphors in expressing their - common
approach to human understanding. In Part II, I describe Balkin's
theory of ideology and his corresponding account of critical theory.
Balkin correctly moves beyond "pejorative" accounts of ideology that
first presume unproblematic grounds for determining the contours of
justice and rationality and then equate ideology with defective modes
of knowledge that yield irrational and unjust social practices.
However, Balkin's use of a transcendental argument to secure critical
theory betrays his model of human understanding. In Part III, I
defend the critique of ideology while avoiding the problems that
Balkin encounters by returning to Gadamer's hermeneutical
philosophy through the work of Calvin Schrag and P. Christopher
Smith. Critical theory survives "postmodernity" and the "interpretive
turn" without transcendental arguments, I argue, and reconceived in
this new light, philosophical hermeneutics effectively points the way
to developing a postmodern account of critical legal theory.
I.

A.

CULTURAL SOFTWARE AND HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

Balkin's Metaphor of CulturalSoftware: Evolution through
Interaction

'4
Balkin uses the term cultural software as a "master metaphor
for describing our capacity to understand and evaluate our world. His
4. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 286.
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metaphor is rather complex and requires careful delineation. First,
Balkin emphasizes that cultural software is not like a program that we
might choose to "run" in order to accomplish a specific task. Instead,
cultural software is an operating system of cognitive tools and skills
that permit us to apprehend, understand, and evaluate the world. We
don't use cultural software; rather, in a very important sense we are
cultural software. From this it follows that cultural software is not a
limited information-processing capacity; it consists (at a minimum) of
"the abilities, associations, heuristics, metaphors, narratives, and
capacities that we employ in understanding and evaluating the social
world."5 Despite the breadth of this definition, cultural software is
bounded. Balkin stresses that because we are finite, historical beings
we embody a set of cognitive tools that "simultaneously enable and
'6
limit our understanding, empower us and have power over us."
Because we literally cannot apprehend the world by putting aside our
cultural software, this opening to the world proves to be a restrictive
filter as well. By using a metaphor to understand the world we
necessarily eschew different metaphors that would yield different
understandings.
The second important feature of cultural software is that it is
"written and rewritten through social interaction and communication."7 Our cultural software continually undergoes revision as a
result of our interaction with other people, each of whom bears
slightly different copies of cultural software. 8 Balkin insists that
cultural software is "in" each individual and is not a "supraindividual"
entity, but he maintains that cultural software is constantly affected
by an "economy of exchange" among interacting individuals. 9
Cultural software is not the possession of an insulated self because, as
a product of exchange and interaction, it is constantly and
unavoidably altered in ways that are beyond the individual's
conscious control or direction. 10
Third, Balkin defines cultural software by reference to its
constituent elements. Balkin borrows the concept of a "meme" from
the evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins to characterize linguistic
and bodily skills- including "skills, norms, ideas, beliefs, attitudes,
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id. at 6.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 14-16.
Id. at 95; see id. at 92-96.
Id. at 23-41 (chapter 2, entitled "Bricolage and the Construction of Cultural Software").
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values, and other forms of information"11- that comprise the building
blocks of cultural software. Balkin defines memes as "the smallest
units of cultural skills or information 'that can [sic] replicate
themselves with reliability and fecundity."'12
Cultural software
evolves because it is exposed to an economy of exchange in which
memes are appropriated, modified, and propagated. Balkin's analysis
is best illustrated by considering the well-known legal norm of
"equality under the law." Balkin would contend that this norm is a
particularly durable meme because it is constantly invoked in a
variety of settings, with the result that it has an ever-changing valence.
This meme is an important part of an American lawyer's cultural
software because it acts as an ordering principle and filter for diffuse
experience; in effect, it is a means of limiting the perception of reality.
This meme is also expansive and dynamic, though, because it is
invoked in new situations and it continually evolves as a result of an
economy of exchange between individuals who will have (usually only
slightly) different practices for employing this meme. Moreover, the
use of this meme is propagated through the group affiliations and
disciplinary practices of lawyers, and so it is socially defined and
maintained beyond immediate exchanges between two people.
Finally, the meme is employed in ordinary discourse in a variety of
nonlegal settings, expanding beyond a restricted scope of operation in
a manner that Balkin explains by borrowing the concept of bricolage
3
from Claude Levi-Strauss.1
Fourth, Balkin argues that memes compete for survival and are
not simply inert bits of information that people choose to employ.
Memes have varying degrees of hardiness, which can be assessed by
the ability of the meme to survive in the economy of exchange while
retaining a similar structure over time. 4 In every culture, "at any
point in time there is a 'meme pool' of memes competing for survival
in the environment of human minds, just as there is a gene pool that
competes in its environment."15
Memes are symbionts in this
environment: "they survive, reproduce, and propagate because it
11. Id. at 43.
12. Id. at 47 (quoting DANIEL C. DENNETr, CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED 201 (1991)).
13. See id. at 23-41. Bricolage refers to the use of tools at hand in a new context or in
response to new problems. Just as we might use a screwdriver to pound a nail in a pinch, we
often use memes in a new context beyond their original use, thereby expanding the scope of the
meme. Balkin argues that, "Cultural bricolage (1) is cumulative, (2) involves unintended uses,
(3) is economical or recursive, and (4) has unintended consequences." Id. at 32.
14. See id. at 57.
15. Id. at 48-49.
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advantages them,' 1 6 and they can spread in a manner very similar to a
computer virus that infects the software programs with which it comes
into contact if the memes are sufficiently "catching.' 1 7 Memes are
more or less successful in surviving and spreading throughout culture
for a variety of substantive and psychological factors that enhance
their utility. 18 In this respect, Balkin adopts a structuralist approach
to explain the ability of some memes to cohere with the dominant
shared features of cultural software and to remain accessible for
continued use, subject to the cognitive capacities and social needs of
their human hosts. 19
Finally, cultural software is defined as the mechanisms (or
"tools") by which memes are transmitted and utilized by social actors.
Balkin provides an extensive and illuminating discussion of a variety
of mechanisms -cultural
heuristics,
narrative
expectations,
homologies and associations, and metaphors and other cognitive
models-but his primary aim is to demonstrate the ambivalent
character of all tools of human understanding. Balkin ambitiously
20
attempts to merge the interpretive turn with the cognitive revolution
for the purpose of demonstrating that the mechanisms by which we
have a world necessarily limit the scope of our understanding of the
world. Understanding is purchased at the cost of filtering the diffuse
experience of reality through cognitive mechanisms such as metaphor
and metonymy. Although all mechanisms of understanding can yield
both good effects and bad effects, the mechanisms themselves are
neither "good" nor "bad." For example, metaphoric understanding
produces good results in some settings by enabling us to order our
world, but metaphoric understanding also produces bad effects in
other settings by limiting or foreclosing certain ways of ordering our
world. 21 Our mechanisms of understanding, as tools, are ambivalent.

16. Id. at 61; see also id. at 61-68.
17. Id. at 60-61.
18. See id. at 75-88.
19. Balkin explains that the substantive factors that determine the success of a meme
extend beyond the "truth or falsity" of the informational content and include the effects
generated by the meme such as strong emotions, entertainment, or support for ongoing
activities. Id. at 75-76. Psychological factors include the ease of comprehension, retention,
retrieval, and communication. Id. at 76-82. Once again, these factors extend beyond the
question of the truth or falsity of the meme, and Balkin emphasizes that some memes are
durable precisely because they provide paradigms of wrong or unsuccessful norms or behaviors.
Id. at 82.
20. Id. at 186-87.
21. Balkin writes: "Metaphorical models are classic examples of the ambivalent nature of
cultural software. They assist understanding in some respects even as they hinder it in others.
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Just as a hammer may be used to build shelter from the environment
or to attack another person, the metaphors we live by can foster just
social conditions or unjust social conditions.
Balkin argues for the superiority of his metaphor of cultural
software by contrasting his views with Gadamer's hermeneutical
approach to human understanding. Balkin acknowledges that his
approach has hermeneutical features, but he insists that the metaphor
of cultural software overcomes serious inadequacies in Gadamer's
philosophy. In particular, he argues that Gadamer's concept of the
"tradition" that shapes human understanding is misguided because it
posits tradition as "supraindividual entity"2 2 that guides understanding, leaving Gadamer unable "to explain how shared cultural
understandings can be shared while still accounting for the
considerable differentiation and disagreement in belief among
members of the same culture or interpretive community. '23 In other
words, Balkin asks of Gadamer: If tradition secures shared beliefs,
how does disagreement arise? And if tradition does not perfectly
secure shared beliefs, then how does it come to be instantiated in
each individual in varying degrees? Balkin contends that he avoids
this conundrum by focusing on the cultural software that is "in" each
individual, while also acknowledging that cultural software is
continually modified through an economy of exchange drawing upon
a (generally) common meme pool.
B.

Gadamer'sMetaphorof Conversationand the Significance of
Tradition

Contrary to Balkin's claim, Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics describes human understanding in a manner that is very
similar to Balkin's account. It is important to reveal this common
starting point, because Gadamer's approach to the critique of
ideology overcomes the deficiencies in Balkin's account of critical
theory by remaining faithful to the general model of human
understanding that he shares with Balkin. Balkin errs by concluding
that in order "[t]o describe the phenomenon of ideology, we need
something like Gadamer's concept of tradition, but we must alter it
considerably to avoid the puzzles that this and similar concepts
Their power stems precisely from their ability to empower understanding by shaping and hence
limiting it." Id. at 248.
22. Id. at 10.
23. Id. at 7.
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produce. ' ' 24 The concept of tradition plays an important role in
Gadamer's hermeneutical philosophy, but Gadamer never regards
tradition as a "supraindividual entity" that imparts understanding to
individuals. In fact, Gadamer's concept of tradition is only one part
of a sophisticated and subtle account of human understanding that is
quite similar to Balkin's account, but which opens greater possibilities
for describing the contours of a postmodern critical theory.
Balkin interprets Gadamer's reference to tradition out of
context, disregarding Gadamer's use of a number of interrelated
concepts to describe human understanding. Gadamer's central claim
is that human understanding is interpretive. He is not concerned with
developing pragmatic strategies for interpreting specific texts or social
acts; rather, Gadamer makes an ontological claim that the
hermeneutical situation of interpreting is universal and unavoidable.
Reflecting on the theme of Truth and Method, he writes: "My real
concern was and is philosophic: not what we do or what we ought to
do, but what happens to us over and above our wanting and doing." 25
Gadamer expresses his thesis by joining several key concepts in a
nuanced phenomenological account. He begins by stating that
individuals embody a "forestructure of meaning" (read: cultural
software; mechanisms of understanding) that is expressed in the form
of "prejudices" or "precommitments" (read: memes), and then argues
that understanding results from a decentering "fusion of horizons"
(read: evolution of memes in a new context) in which two individuals
have a "genuine experience" (read: economy of exchange) that
26
disrupts the pretense that either individual is an insulated self.
Gadamer emphasizes the mutuality that defines exchanges
leading to understanding by proposing his own metaphor in the form
of a synecdoche: he suggests that the experience of understanding is
revealed by reflecting on the experience of coming to an agreement in
conversation. Beginning with the insight that "the more genuine a
24. Id. at 13.
25. GADAMER, supra note 3, at xxviii.
26. I have discussed these features of Gadamer's philosophy in some detail in previous
articles.
See Francis J. Mootz III, Law in Flux: Philosophical Hermeneutics, Legal
Argumentation, and the Natural Law Tradition,11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 311 (1999) [hereinafter
Mootz, Law in Flux]; Francis J. Mootz III, Rhetorical Knowledge in Legal Practiceand Theory, 6
S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 491 (1998) [hereinafter Mootz, Rhetorical Knowledge]; Francis J.
Mootz III, Rethinking the Rule of Law: A Demonstration That the Obvious Is Plausible, 61
TENN. L. REV. 69 (1993) [hereinafter Mootz, Rule of Law]; Francis J. Mootz III, The
Ontological Basis of Legal Hermeneutics: A Proposed Model of Inquiry Based on the Work of
Gadamer, Habermas and Ricoeur, 68 B.U. L. REV. 523 (1988) [hereinafter Mootz, Ontological
Basis].
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conversation is, the less its conduct lies within the will of either
partner," Gadamer characterizes the understanding that occurs in
conversation as "an event that happens to us. '2 7 The metaphor of
conversation underscores the ego-decentering thrust of Gadamer's
philosophy, not just by recalling the experience of recognizing the
superior insight of one's conversational partner, but also by recalling
the conversational play that occurs beyond the conscious direction of
28
either person.
The dialogical character of language... leaves behind it any
starting point in the subjectivity of the subject, and especially in the
meaning-directed intentions of the speaker.
What we find
happening in speaking is not a mere reification of intended
meaning, but an endeavor that continually modifies itself, or better:
a continually recurring temptation to engage oneself in something
or to become involved with
2 9 someone. But that means to expose
oneself and to risk oneself.
Gadamer persuasively reinforces Balkin's description of an economy
of exchange that affects each individual's cultural software by
pointing to the common experience of a conversation, in which
something is expressed that moves beyond the two individuals and
represents a shared creation beyond either's instrumental control.
Gadamer's references to "tradition" can be understood only in
light of the conceptual backdrop that Gadamer summarizes with the
metaphor of conversation. Gadamer emphasizes the power of
tradition only to emphasize that an individual interpreter can never
rise above her historical and finite "hermeneutical situation." In this
sense, tradition is nothing more than an ongoing conversation in
which we always already find ourselves, a conversation that bears
historical weight because, as it spirals forward through time, it
establishes the meme pool through which an individual gains an
understanding of the world. Tradition is "outside" individual selves
only to the extent that memes are continually regenerated in playful,
conversational exchanges that take place over time and throughout
the culture, and so it constitutes the horizon within which an
individual can understand at all. It is clear, though, that tradition
27. GADAMER, supra note 3, at 383.
28. Gadamer's phenomenological description of the experience of "play" forms the core of
Truth and Method, and he uses the metaphor of conversation to emphasize the linguisticality of
human understanding. For a review of Gadamer's concept of "play," see Mootz, Ontological
Basis, supra note 26, at 531-33.
29. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Text and Interpretation (Dennis J. Schmidt & Richard E.
Palmer trans.), in DIALOGUE AND DECONSTRUCrION: THE GADAMER-DERRIDA ENCOUNTER

21, 26 (Diane P. Michelfelder & Richard E. Palmer eds., 1989).
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exists only "in" dynamic exchanges between individuals.
As
Gadamer relates, Heidegger's ontological treatment of the hermeneutical circle emphasizes this dynamic character of tradition:
"Tradition is not simply a permanent precondition [that is later used
by a subject in interpretation]; rather, we produce it ourselves
inasmuch as we understand, participate in the evolution of tradition,
and hence further determine it ourselves."30 Tradition is cognitively
empowering, rather than a reservoir of information from which a
subject can freely choose.
Although Gadamer emphasizes that tradition serves as a
challenge to, and provocation of, individual interpretive strategies, he
is quite clear that tradition does not confront individuals as a force
from outside their existence. Gadamer writes that
Our usual relationship to the past is not characterized by distancing
and freeing ourselves from tradition [as if it were an external
entity]. Rather, we are always situated within traditions, and this is
no objectifying process-i.e., we do not conceive of what tradition
says as something other, something alien. It is always part of us, a
model or exemplar, a kind of cognizance that our later historical
judgment would hardly regard as a kind
of knowledge but as the
31
most ingenuous affinity with tradition.
Gadamer's tradition is much like Balkin's cultural software: it is our
continually modified opening to the world-a historical, social, and
finite set of cognitive mechanisms and memes-that precludes "pure"
knowledge. 32 Tradition is ambivalent: it is neither the "shackles of the
past," nor a utopian "golden age," but instead it is the dynamic
situation in which we find ourselves as historical, finite beings who
cannot look at the world with entirely "fresh" eyes. 33 "Understanding
30. GADAMER, supra note 3, at 293.
31. Id. at 282.
32. Gadamer starkly distinguishes tradition from a natural law conception of "the eternal
orders of nature," and he emphasizes that "the way we experience one another, the way we
experience historical traditions, the way we experience the natural givenness of our existence
and of our world, constitute a truly hermeneutic universe, in which we are not imprisoned, as if
behind insurmountable barriers, but to which we are opened." Id. at xxiv.
33. Gadamer's translators make this point in their preface to Truth and Method in the
course of explaining the difficulty they faced in rendering Gadamer's use of "tradition" in
English:
This ongoing conversation is Uberlieferung, "tradition." English has no corresponding
verb, nor any adjective that maintains the active verbal implication, nor any noun for
what is carried down in "tradition." We have therefore admitted the neologism
"traditionary text," and have sometimes used the phrase "what comes down to us from
the past" or "handed down from the past" to convey the active sense of the German.
We are likely to think of "tradition" as what lies merely behind us or as what we take
over more or less automatically. On the contrary, for Gadamer "tradition" or "what is
handed down from the past" confronts us as a task, as an effort of understanding we
feel ourselves required to make because we recognize our limitations, even though no
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is to be thought of less as a subjective act than as participatingin an
event of tradition, a process4 of transmission in which past and present
3
are constantly mediated.
Gadamer's concept of tradition not only is consistent with the
model of human understanding that he shares with Balkin, it serves as
a better vehicle for expressing this model. Balkin draws heavily on
contemporary debates in evolutionary biology to argue that memes
compete for survival in the cultural software of human hosts, and that
this competition can be viewed productively through the lens of
contemporary cognitive science. Although cultural software is "in"
individuals, he contends that memes can be isolated for study just as
scientists can isolate human genes for study apart from individual
persons. George Taylor persuasively demonstrates that Balkin
retreats from his model of human understanding by taking this tack,
moving away from bricolage that occurs in a historically contingent
economy of exchange and embracing a more functionalist account of
35
the survival of memes.
David Charny criticizes Balkin on similar grounds, pointing out
that Balkin's use of the concept of a meme is particularly curious in
light of the original purpose of the concept. Charny notes that the
meme was developed by biologists, cognitive psychologists, and
philosophers who sought to describe the processes of thought with
conceptions that were entirely physiological and material-or, at
least, observable by the procedures of empirical science-and so
metaphysical conceptions
would not depend on supposedly occult
3' 6
such as an individual "consciousness.
one compels us to do so. It precludes complacency, passivity, and self-satisfaction with
what we securely possess; instead it requires active questioning and self-questioning.
Joel Weinshiemer & Donald G. Marshall, Translators' Prefaceto GADAMER, supra note 3, at xi,
xvi.
34. GADAMER, supra note 3, at 290. Gadamer makes the point that it is the historicity of
understanding that paradoxically enables understanding to rise above solipsism and
subjectivism.
This means, above all, that it is not correct to assert that the study of a text or a
tradition is completely dependent upon our own decision making. Such a freedom,
such a standing at a distance from the examined object simply does not exist. We all
stand in the life-stream of tradition and do not have the sovereign distance that the
natural sciences [methodologically] maintain in order to conduct experiments and to
construct theories.
...
We are not observers who look at history from a distance; rather, insofar as we
are historical creatures, we are always on the inside of the history that we are striving
to comprehend.
HANS-GEORG GADAMER, THE BEGINNING OF PHILOSOPHY 28 (Rod Coltman trans.,
Continuum Publ'g 1998) (1996).
35. See George Taylor, Justice As Postmodern? 12-13, 26 (unpublished paper, on file with
the Chicago-Kent Law Review) (reviewing BALK1N, supra note 2).
36. David Charny, Farewellto an Idea? Ideology in Legal Theory, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1596,
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Balkin readily concedes that memes are not distinct entities that are
transmitted throughout culture in the same way that a gene is
transferred to offspring, 37 and so his memetic analysis inevitably
generates tension within his model of human understanding.
Consequently, Charny suggests that Gadamer's concept of "tradition"
is more suitable than Balkin's memetic analysis for exploring the
model of human understanding that Balkin outlines.
The merely behavioral notion of transmittability is inadequate to
the task [of explaining the evolution of cultural software] because it
does not tell us how to decide what counts as proper transmission
of a meme, as opposed to invention of a new one. Rather, what
makes the fragment accessible cognitively is its embedding in a
larger structure of perception or analysis- the sort of structure with
which Gadamer, for example, was concerned in the theories of
"tradition" that Balkin wishes to reject.3"
Balkin's analysis of memes adds nothing to our understanding of
human understanding, Charny concludes, because Balkin provides no
guidance for determining how memes work in human settings. Balkin
simply cannot explain how memes "function" or "survive" in the
cultural realm, except to note the factors (such as their cognitive fit
with human memories) that influence this process.39
Charny
concludes that Balkin must develop his references to rhetoric in
greater detail, because the survival of memes within a culture is
40
linked to their persuasive effects in ongoing rhetorical exchanges.

1603 (1999) (reviewing BALKIN, supra note 2).
37. See BALKIN, supra note 2, at 51-54. Balkin concedes that genetic mutation is relatively
rare and, at least for the moment, random, whereas memetic mutation is constant because
memes are part of a dynamic symbolic structure of meaning. "Human beings are not passive
receptors of memes; they are active processors and recombiners of the cultural messages and
skills they receive from others." Id. at 52. It is precisely the innovations of human actors that a
memetic analysis renders obscure, especially when Balkin writes: "Memes 'use' people for the
purpose of their own propagation.... [T]hey survive, reproduce, and propagate because it
advantages them." Id. at 61.
38. Charny, supra note 36, at 1605-06.
39. See id. at 1606-07.
40. Charny writes:
The public space is not a collection of rational selves, but a swarm of viral particles of
information. What rescues this from utter bleakness is the (individually limited though
collectively determinative) power of each self to influence memetic propagation
[through a postmodern rhetorical exchange], and the celebratory sense in which this
diversity spawns ideals and aspirations that might elude a more tightly controlled
communal discourse.
Id. at 1614. As I discuss below, Gadamer emphasizes this same rhetorical dimension in a
manner that answers the immediately voiced fear that a rhetorical analysis leads to the
conclusion that cultural software evolves out of a chaotic, "anything goes," multicultural clash of
incommensurable claims.
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Charny's insight is worth developing in detail: Gadamer's
concept of tradition proves to be a much better vehicle for developing
the model of human understanding that Balkin and Gadamer share.
Because Gadamer conceives of tradition as an ongoing conversation
in which individuals already find themselves, he recuperates the
rhetorical tradition in order to explain (returning to Balkin's
terminology) how cultural software evolves within an economy of
exchange. Gadamer argues that genuine rhetoric concerns the
"discovery and transmission of insight and knowledge," an experience
that is exemplified in the "art of leading a conversation."' 41 Genuine
rhetoric is distinguished from the "idle speculations of the Sophists"
because it involves more than the manipulation of linguistic
indeterminacy. 42 Construed not just as an opening to the world but
also as a task or question that confronts the individual, tradition is not
just a static accumulation of information. Instead, tradition is a
never-ceasing dynamic of rhetorical exchanges occurring within a
horizon that is defined by the historical effects of previous exchanges
within the culture, and in which prejudices are appropriated and
43
developed by human actors seeking to motivate others to act.
Balkin's approach tends to conjure an image of an individual
with her cultural software "in place" who later comes into contact
with others in a manner that leads to slight modifications in her
cultural software. But this picks up the story of human understanding
far too late in the book. Our cultural software is not an operating
program that is loaded into us and then later slightly modified, but
instead is the product of a lifetime of understandings that bear the
deep imprints of the tradition that enables understanding. A person
develops her cultural software before she is a conscious self by
haltingly entering into an ongoing cultural conversation that
Gadamer characterizes as tradition. This acculturation is linguistically mediated in increasingly complex ways as the child learns to
understand language, to speak, and ultimately to read and write, but
acculturation is not solely linguistic in nature. The child learns
nonlinguistic interactions as well, such as smiling, averting her eyes,
or hugging another person in the appropriate contexts, all of which
form the social context for her linguistically mediated participation in
41. Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Expressive Power of Language: On the Function of
Rhetoric for Knowledge, 107 PUBLICATIONS MOD. LANGUAGE ASS'N AM. 348, 350 (1992).
42. GADAMER, supra note 3, at 19; see also Gadamer, supra note 41, at 350.
43. See, e.g., Mootz, Rhetorical Knowledge, supra note 26 (drawing out the rhetorical
dimensions of Gadamer's hermeneutics).
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social exchanges. The important point is that she will not experience
her introduction to this ongoing conversation as encounter with an
"external" tradition for the simple reason that it is this conversation
that provides her with the resources for becoming conversant and
participating in the activity of understanding. Tradition is the shared
realm of understanding that opens a world for individuals to join in its
ongoing economy of exchange. Once the individual becomes
conversant she cannot escape tradition and start a new conversation,
but instead can only participate as a conversation partner within a
constantly evolving tradition.
It is a profound mistake, then, to regard tradition as merely a
starting point of understanding that is later surpassed by the
individual. Human understanding is traditionary (finite and historically conditioned) yet also inventive (the product of rhetorical
exchanges oriented to persuasion). Balkin's memetic analysis could
account, at most, for habit and convention, but it provides little
guidance for explaining what I have elsewhere termed "rhetorical
knowledge." 44 Rhetorical knowledge emerges out of the preunderstandings embedded in patterns of social discourse and interaction,
but it is distinguished from mere convention by the inventive
representation and reinscription of "prejudices" by the rhetorical
actor. Surveying accepted topics, norms, and opinions as resources
for confronting the demands of the present, individuals continually
conjoin these constitutive features of themselves and their society in
unique ways. Balkin is certainly correct to look to cognitive science
to help explain why certain "memes" are more available for rhetorical
elaboration than others. However, Taylor and Charny are equally
correct in emphasizing that this inquiry provides only one part of the
picture of human understanding, and that it represents a relatively
insignificant part if it is not successfully wedded to a broader
hermeneutical and rhetorical investigation of why and how only a
fraction of the cognitively accessible memes become important within
a culture.
This point can be recast by considering Balkin's use of the
metaphor of evolution. 45 Balkin appears to place equal weight on a
Lamarckian conception of evolution (in which the organism directly
responds to the demands of the environment with bricolage,leading
44. For an extended discussion of "rhetorical knowledge" that informs my discussion in
this paragraph, see Mootz, Rhetorical Knowledge, supra note 26.
45. I am indebted to George Taylor's lead in making this argument. See Taylor, supra note
35, at 8-13.
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to unintended uses and effects that cumulate over time) and a

Darwinian conception of evolution (in which random variations in
memes are naturally selected over time according to their tendency to6
support the organism's adaptation to a changing environment).4

Gadamer's rhetorical conception of tradition emphasizes the
Lamarckian sense of evolution, and thereby provides a necessary
corrective to Balkin's tendency to discount human agency. The
survival of memes is not particularly interesting or significant at the
level of determining the qualities that render information easily

cognized. The more fundamental question is how individuals
discriminate among numerous cognitively adequate memes for47 the
purpose of addressing contemporary questions and challenges. Of
course, it bears emphasis that Balkin and Gadamer agree that human
agency must not be characterized as the sovereign act of the cogito.

However, Gadamer's characterization of tradition as an ongoing
conversation that provokes and guides rhetorical exchanges provides
a superior explanation of the insight that he shares with Balkin:
cultural knowledge is neither the master of, nor just a tool available
to, the individual. 48 Tradition stands over and above individual claims
to selfhood, even as the individual rhetorically refashions traditionary

prejudices in conversational exchanges that seek to motivate action in
response to the practical demands presented by changing circumstances.
In short, Balkin's efforts to distinguish Gadamer's philosophical
hermeneutics prove to be in vain. Gadamer's philosophy provides a
better account of the model of human understanding that he (largely)

46. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 35-41.
47. David Charny makes this point in a similar manner. See Charny, supra note 36, at 1615.
Interestingly, it appears that a Lamarckian approach may be gaining respectability even in
biology with respect to specific evolutionary processes. See EDWARD J. STEELE ET AL.,
LAMARCK'S SIGNATURE: How RETROGENES ARE CHANGING DARWIN'S NATURAL
SELECTION PARADIGM (1998) (arguing that immunities acquired during a parent's life might, in
some respects, be passed on to a child).
48. In his concluding chapter, Balkin makes this point in a manner that calls to mind the
point of Gadamer's emphasis on tradition and rhetoric in Truth and Method. Balkin writes:
I noted earlier that we human beings exist in a great tide of informational
evolution. Yet our participation in the tide of cultural evolution does not mean that
we lack agency. Our cultural software surely affects our behavior; our actions always
have unintended consequences. But it is a far cry from recognizing this to inferring
that we are mere instruments of memetic evolution. We must reject a simplistic
either/or view which insists that either we are in full control of the development of our
memes or they are in full control of us.
... We are active participants in the growth and spread of cultural software, even
if we do not have full control over the terms of its evolution.
BALKIN, supra note 2, at 293.
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shares with Balkin. At the level of describing human understanding,
Balkin's differing approach generates some unnecessary tensions,
albeit tensions which appear to be generally harmless to this point.
However, as Balkin proceeds to develop his theory of ideology and
critique, the significance of his deviation from Gadamer becomes
apparent. In the next part of the Article I will describe and criticize
Balkin's conceptions of ideology and critique, and then in Part III I
will defend Gadamer's very different account of ideology critique.
Gadamer's use of the concept of tradition within the broader
metaphor of understanding as a conversation charts a productive
course for postmodern critical theory that adheres to the model of
human understanding that Balkin purports to defend.
II. IDEOLOGY, CRITIQUE, AND TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENT:
BALKIN'S QUEST TO REPROGRAM CULTURAL SOFTWARE

A.

Ideological Effects

Balkin contends that a new theory of ideology follows from his
model of human understanding. He begins by rejecting "pejorative"
approaches that characterize ideology as the product of defective
modes of understanding. "Pejorative conceptions usually assume a
unidirectional model of ideological analysis: the ideology-free analyst
locates and criticizes ideology in the ideologically deluded analysand.
Disagreements between analyst and analysand about social reality are
explained as ideological delusion on the part of the analysand. ' '49
Pejorative accounts of ideology inevitably collapse under the weight
of self-reference, though, because there can be no guarantee that it is
not the critic who is employing defective tools of understanding. 0
The problem of self-reference becomes acute when competing camps
accuse each other of false consciousness and ideological delusion,
since there is no independent standard that can adjudicate which
group is engaged in ideological thinking. As a result, the proponents
of a pejorative account of ideology cannot avoid the relativist morass
that postmodern thinkers have openly embraced, even if the resulting
relativism is punctuated by the sloganeering and accusations of those
who remain convinced of the authenticity of their own worldview.
Pejorative accounts of ideology fail because they define ideology
as the product of defective tools of understanding. But, as Balkin
49. Id. at 126.
50. Id. at 125.
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emphasizes, the mechanisms of understanding are themselves neither
true nor false, neither just nor unjust. He insists that ideology is not
"something separate from cultural understanding. The mechanisms
of what we call ideological thinking are no different in kind from the
ordinary forms of thought. There is not a separate set of devices that
constitute 'the ideological' and another set that constitute 'the
nonideological."'51 All mechanisms of understanding are capable of
fostering both just and unjust social conditions. Ideology is one
possible effect of ordinary mechanisms of understanding, an effect
that occurs "when cultural software 'goes wrong' in some important
way. '5 2 Consequently, the "study of ideology.., might be summarized as the study of 'when good heuristics go bad,"'53 or, more
descriptively, as the study of how a heuristic with the potential for just
effects within society can in certain contexts foster injustice. Balkin
contends that the "tools of understanding that are entirely benign in
some circumstances may become malignant if too much is demanded
of them or if the context in which they are employed changes
sufficiently. ' 54 For example, one generation might employ the
metaphor of working to build a "color blind" society for the purpose
of overcoming racism, but a later generation might invoke the
metaphor to attack affirmative action programs, in effect eliding
systemic "white privilege" and solidifying gross inequalities based on
race.
.If ideolo y is not a defective mode of understanding, but instead
is equated with the detrimental effects that certain understandings
have within a social context, then the identification and critique of
ideology is possible only if the critical theorist has a standard against
which to judge the effects of the understandings generated by cultural
software.
Identifying the mechanisms of understanding is a
descriptive task, but Balkin stresses that ideological analysis
"necessarily has a normative dimension. It cannot be value free but
must presuppose a view about what is good and bad, advantageous
and disadvantageous, just and unjust."55 Balkin readily acknowledges
that he has not avoided the problem of self-reference by invoking a
normative criterion of justice. All human understanding is a function
of ambivalent mechanisms of understanding, and so the critic can
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

107.
110.
185.
108.
111.
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define the standard of "justice" according to which she judges
ideological effects only by employing the very same mechanisms of
understanding that give rise to the potentially ideological beliefs. Put
simply, the critic cannot step outside the limitations of her cultural
software in order to perceive a "pure" standard of justice against
which ordinary thinking can be judged. 6
Critics will offer the obvious rejoinder that "Balkin does not
suggest how he has been able to either control or transcend his own
social construction."5 7 However, Balkin insists that the ambivalent
character of our tools of understanding reveals that the problem of
self-reference is really no problem at all.
How does an ambivalent conception of ideology deal with the
problem of self-reference ...? It accepts the inevitability of selfreference but argues-consistent with the general conception of
ambivalence-that this feature of our thought does not necessarily
make ideological analysis futile or unhelpful. Quite the contrary:
the ability of thought to turn upon itself
5 8 is a prerequisite for an
adequate analysis of ideological thinking.
In other words, Balkin claims that self-reference is not an obstacle to
the critique of ideology, but instead makes the critique of ideology
possible.
Balkin expressly follows Gadamer's analysis to explain how the
self-referential character of thought works to reveal ideological
effects. An individual's cultural software is a prejudiced structure of
preunderstanding that empowers understanding precisely by limiting
the possibilities. 59 Because no person, even the critic of ideology, can
escape entirely from her prejudiced horizon, the critic must constantly
assess the possibility that it is her own thinking that is leading to
ideological effects rather than the understanding that she is
analyzing. 6° Again expressly adopting Gadamer's analysis, Balkin
argues that the critique of ideology requires a constant check of one's
own biases and prejudices by suspending the inevitable urge to brand
those who have different understandings as suffering from false
consciousness. 61 In addition to searching for ideological effects in

56. See id. at 134 (arguing that "there is no point at which we abandon the tools of
understanding so that we might critically reflect upon all of them").
57. Michael J. Gerhardt, Deconstructing Balkin, 2 GREEN BAG 2d 219, 222 (1999)
(reviewing BALKIN, supra note 2).
58. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 127.
59. See id. at 311 n.13 (citing Gadamer's analysis of prejudices).
60. Id. at 129.
61. See id. at 311 n.14 (citing Gadamer's analysis of the "hermeneutic circle").
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patterns of understanding within a society, then, the critic must
constantly assess the potential that her own understanding leads to
ideological effects.
Successful ideological analysis is possible because and to the
extent that the analyst's tools of understanding enable her to
understand social conditions well enough to perform the analysis.
For precisely the same reason, however, it is possible that the
analysand has a grasp of social conditions that conflicts with the
analyst's but is nevertheless equally adequate or even more valid.
The analysand may in fact see something that the analyst does not
see as clearly. By considering how the analysand's thought might
have elements of truth or justice in it, the analyst can attempt to
analyze and modify her own views. By using the beliefs and
opinions of others as a partial check on the analyst's own,
ideological analysis attempts to improve social understanding not
only for the analysand but for the analyst as well.
I call this dialectical approach to the study of ideology or
cultural software a critical approach. By criticalI do not mean the
discovery of flaws or defects in the thought of another person but
rather a process of self-reflection and self-discovery that is part and
parcel of the ideological analysis of the thought of other
62 persons.
A critical approach is inevitably a self-critical approach.
This passage is worth quoting at length, because at first glance Balkin
appears to embrace Gadamer's dialogical account of human
understanding, in which a fusion of horizons occurs that moves
beyond the initial understandings of both dialogue partners.
But this convergence with Gadamer's philosophy presents a
problem for Balkin. If ideological analysis is nothing other than a
dialogical engagement in which the critic and her conversational
partner both reach new understandings, then ideological analysis
cannot be differentiated from simple human understanding. This is
problematic because the traditional goal of critical theory is to
identify those circumstances in which an apparent fusion of horizons
in fact represents ideological effects. Balkin responds to this problem
by reinvesting the critic with the power to determine the scope of her
engagement with the other, so as to avoid being drawn into
ideological beliefs that co-opt her understanding. 63 Balkin regards
this wariness of the other as a crucial difference that distinguishes his
approach from Gadamer's approach. 64 In the above-quoted passage,
for example, Balkin suggests that the critic chooses to use the beliefs
62. Id. at 130.
63. Id. at 130-32.
64. Id. at 313 n.15.
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and opinions of others as a partialcheck on her own prejudices. The
analyst cannot dominate her subject as if the other is an object of
study, because the analyst's tools of understanding are no less
ambivalent than her subject's tools; nevertheless, the analyst also
must guard against becoming ensnared in the subject's ideological
thinking. Both prospects represent unavoidable "risks" of selfreferential critical thinking that the critic of ideology must carefully
avoid.
It should be clear that Balkin has succeeded only in restating the
problems that all theories of ideology and critique confront. 6
Balkin's argument to this point consists of a few key claims. First, the
critic must guard against the ideological effects of her own cultural
software while also guarding against being co-opted by the ideological
effects of the social understandings that she is analyzing. Second, the
critic cannot identify ideological effects as the products of certain
defective tools of understanding because these tools are ambivalent;
ideological effects are determined only by reference to a conception
of justice as applied in a particular social context.
Finally,
conceptions of justice are themselves understood only by means of
cultural software. Balkin thus acknowledges
the ordinariness and even the banality of the processes by which we
understand ourselves and the social world around us....
Ideological analysis is not a master discipline that can promise to
regulate or direct our understanding of the social world. Rather, it
is a form of knowledge
acquisition just like the forms it purports to
66
study and critique.

Balkin faces an obvious challenge: What can possibly ground the
critique of ideology if these three presuppositions hold true?
B.

Justice As Transcendent

In order to address this challenge and overcome an apparent
roadblock to defining critical theory, Balkin suddenly abandons his
model of human understanding. As Step Feldman comments, it is as
if Balkin experiences "postmodern vertigo" at this juncture and reacts
instinctively by reaching down and grabbing "for a piece of firm,
65. Michael Gerhardt notes that Balkin "suggests that we can resolve this paradox [of selfreference] by trying to be candid with ourselves and others about the sources of our own
thinking," but Balkin succeeds only in making "an aspirational declaration," which "is not the
same thing as actually overcoming it or proving we have overcome it." Gerhardt, supra note 57,
at 223.
66. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 135-37 (discussing Stanley Fish's critique of the quest to
develop critical self-consciousness with approval).
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modernist ground. '67 Balkin avoids a relativist conclusion to his
argument by contending that "ideological analysis, and indeed all
moral discourse, must presuppose a transcendent value of justice.
Tools of understanding produced by cultures to pursue justice are
articulations of this value." 68 The transcendent value of justice is an
inchoate "ideal... demand or longing" that we attempt to understand through its "incomplete and imperfect" articulation with the
tools of cultural understanding; it is not reducible to these historical
articulations, but rather is the presupposition for them. 69 The
transcendent ideal of justice is an abiding guarantor of the critical
project.
Balkin is quite clear that the transcendent value of justice is a
regulative ideal rather than a detailed set of substantive prescriptions.
Justice is immanent within reality, but only as an "inexhaustible" and
"indeterminate demand."70 Balkin argues that we use the tools of
understanding to implement justice within a particular context, and
that we can never exhaustively implement justice within existing
social institutions. "To be just we must construct examples of justice
using the indeterminate urge for justice as our goad rather than as our
guide."" Balkin credits Habermas's proceduralist account of reason
for revealing that the very "rhetorical structure of dialogic encounters
reveals the regulative nature of transcendent ideals in a particularly
striking way,"7" but he also argues that there is a substantive
dimension to the transcendent ideal of justice.
Even when we accuse our interlocutors of great evils, we make
reference to a common value of justice that we claim they have
failed to live up to. And their defense, even if unconvincing to us,
will appeal to reasons that they insist should persuade us and
exculpate them. When we criticize our opponent to a third party,
we invoke an ideal of justice that applies not only to ourselves and
the audience, but to the person we criticize.
In short, transcendent ideals are presupposed by the rhetorical
situation of having to persuade an audience. They seem to spring
forth magically from the rhetorical encounter. Like a beautiful
67. Stephen M. Feldman, The Politics of PostmodernJurisprudence,95 MICH. L. REV. 166,
Feldman is discussing an earlier article in which Balkin first makes the
193 (1996).
transcendental argument that is continued, in modified form, in Balkin's book. See J.M. Balkin,
Transcendental Deconstruction, TranscendentJustice, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1131 (1994).
68. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 143.
69. Id. at 144.
70. Id. at 161.
71. Id. at 162.
72. Id. at 148.
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mosaic whose pattern emerges from the juxtaposition of diverse
stones, the framework of transcendent ideals that undergirds the
rhetorical situation emerges through
the confrontation between
73
different and conflicting perspectives.
Ideological analysis simply represents a special case of dialogue, in
which the critic must presuppose transcendent ideals of justice in
order to critically assess her understandings and the social understandings that she is studying. The transcendent ideal girds critical
inquiry amidst historical flux: "The variance of history is coherent
because we understand it against the background of the
transcendent. ''74
The transcendental argument bears a heavy burden in Balkin's
theory, and it does so uneasily. If Balkin claims that justice is a
transcendent value only for the purpose of reinforcing the fact that
our history and cultural practices evidence attempts to work out the
requirements of a value that cannot be fully defined, then ascribing
transcendent status appears to do no work; in this case, Balkin is
better left with his emphasis on dialogic engagement. 75 However,
with his mosaic metaphor, Balkin appears to suggest that the
transcendent value of justice is more in the nature of an organizing
force that has a gravitational effect on the otherwise fragmented
rhetorical activities of persons who inevitably are limited by their
historically and socially conditioned tools of understanding. The
transcendent value exerts a mysterious force, subsiding below
rhetorical exchanges as some kind of unifying principle. In this case,
the transcendental argument does work for Balkin, but is
unconvincing and misleading.
To his credit, Balkin has effectively undermined the lingering
hopes for developing a "pejorative" theory of ideology and has
squarely presented the problem of a postmodern theory of ideology
and critique. Unfortunately, although there is some ambiguity in
what Balkin intends to convey by claiming that justice is a
transcendental organizing drive that subtends critical theory, his
recourse to a transcendent value of justice appears to be either an

73. Id. at 149.
74. Id. at 170.
75. At several points Balkin emphasizes that the transcendental argument is a means of
breaking down parochialism and acknowledging the absence of a determinate and unvarying
conception of the "good life." See id. at 148. However, Balkin does not explain why he feels
compelled to identify a transcendent ideal outside the dialogic confrontation with another
person to accomplish this goal, since the dialogic encounter is a direct and unmediated
experience of one's parochialism.
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empty gesture or a betrayal of his analysis of human understanding.
Under one reading, Balkin is arguing that human nature includes a
drive toward justice that is presupposed by, and evident in, every
human interaction. This "strong transcendental argument" completely undercuts his model of human understanding by positing a
76
timeless and universal substrate upon which critical theory builds.
As several reviewers have emphasized, human history undercuts
Balkin's claim: it seems all too obvious that some individuals interact
with others in a manner that evidences, if anything, an inexhaustible
urge toward violence and domination. 77 The "strong transcendental
argument" attempts to assume away the problem that Balkin poses
for himself.
Under a different reading, Balkin proposes a "weak transcendental argument" that posits the urge toward justice as a
presupposition only of arguments about justice itself. Even if some
people act without any reference to a concept of justice, the argument
would run, those who seek to orient their behavior in accord with
justice necessarily presuppose a transcendent value. But the weak
transcendental argument is unpersuasive on two very different fronts.
On one hand, there is no explanation why the transcendent value
cannot be fully apprehended and implemented, as a religious believer
might argue in the course of developing a substantive natural law
theory. On the other hand, this argument does little to dispel the
fears of nihilism. As Charny observes, "It is quite a leap ...to start
from the requirement of value judgment to understand human action,
and to end up with the particular type of value judgment needed for
''78 Balkin's transcendental
ideological critique as Balkin imagines it.
argument appears to be an intellectual form of whistling in the dark
to convince himself that he is not walking alone.
Balkin's transcendental argument encounters these difficulties
for a very simple reason. After meticulously describing human
understanding as the historical cumulation of bricolage produced by
an economy of exchange, he abandons a thoroughly temporal
approach to human understanding. Although every individual effort
to act justly remains temporal in his account, the purpose of his
transcendental argument is to rise above the flux of existence even if
only to posit a motivating gesture that remains noncontingent. The
76. See Taylor, supra note 35, at 24-26.
77. Id. at 25; see Feldman, supra note 67, at 200.
78. Charny, supra note 36, at 1609.
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messy problem of making value judgments, of bringing the
transcendental value of justice to bear in a particular context, is
superceded by the abiding transcendental ideal of justice. But as Step
Feldman recalls, "Even if we are born with some precultural drives or
values-such as justice-our being-in-the-world is so culturally
saturated that a search for a precultural pearl buried somewhere
beneath the cultural waves seems at best irrelevant and at worst
nonsensical."7 9 There simply seems to be no point to Balkin's
transcendental turn.
Anticipating strong negative reactions to his recourse to
transcendentalism, in the final analysis Balkin defends his
transcendental argument on pragmatic grounds by claiming that he
provides the "most adequate way of describing this inadequacy [or
the human predicament]" at this time.80 Balkin concedes that his
analysis, like all cultural articulations, is subject to revision if it proves
to be inadequate for articulating features of human life-such as
justice-which are not "wholly contingent" and do not exist "wholly
internal to our discourse. 81 Balkin claims only that, at this point in
history, a transcendent conception of justice best serves our purposes
in moving forward. Of course, his modesty is simply another
rhetorical device for reaffirming the timeless and universal qualities
of the transcendent value of justice.
As he observes, "Our
conceptions are revisable only because there is something against
82
which we revise them."
I believe that Balkin has backed himself, admittedly with some
quite impressive footwork, into a corner.
The transcendental
argument lodges the value of justice beyond the dialogue rather than
in the dialogue. This has profound consequences. If a transcendent
value of justice exists beyond immediate rhetorical exchanges, then
the critic is quite capable of pursuing an application of this
transcendent value in solitary thought.
Balkin emphasizes the
importance of challenging one's presuppositions by conversing with
others, but Balkin's critic is never wholly given over to the dialogue.
As he emphasizes,
An important difference between a critical approach and
Gadamer's hermeneutics is that we do not engage in this approach
with the goal of reaching an agreement with the analysand. Rather,
79. Feldman, supra note 67, at 197-98.
80. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 168.
81. ld.
82. Id.
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we are interested in discovering both what we can learn from the
analysand and what we ultimately cannot agree with because
of the
83
ideological effects we perceive in the analysand's thought.
A dialogue partner can provide important information in the effort to
develop a better articulation of the transcendent conception of
justice, but ultimately in Balkin's theory it is the critic who must
carefully determine to what extent the other person may serve this
useful function in the critical project. The other person is a source of
information and potentially a corrective challenge to the critic's
shortsightedness, but the other person is not empowered to set the
agenda by posing the questions that the critic addresses. The critic
remains, to borrow Pierre Schlag's felicitous phrase, a "relatively
84
autonomous self" in charge of her critical inquiry.
Balkin's critic is too discerning and selective. In the end, he falls
back on a traditional subject-centered approach, underwritten with a
transcendental argument. Extending Balkin's central metaphor, his
critic appears to be a (cultural) software programmer who works to
eliminate bugs in the social system by seeking input from others, but
ultimately the critic is responsible for upgrading the program with
reference to an ideal that is beyond actual collaborative endeavors
with other programmers. The critique of ideology is the quest to
reprogram cultural software. The critic reads tools of understanding
like lines of code, and assesses the merits and demerits of their
deployment in various contexts against a baseline understanding of
justice.
My thesis is that Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics provides
a sophisticated account of ideology and critique that remains
consistent with the broad contours of postmodern sensibilities
without disavowing the reality of reasonable dialogue oriented
toward emancipation. Gadamer overcomes the problems that Balkin
encounters by resolutely adhering to his model of human
understanding in the face of powerful pressures and desires to
articulate a solid, even if transcendental and rather than empirical,
grounding for critical inquiry. Balkin's impressive accomplishments
fall short, but Balkin does reframe the issues sufficiently to require a
new reading of Gadamer's philosophy. In the concluding section, I
will offer a reading of Gadamer's philosophy that responds to
Balkin's challenge and renders explicit certain features of Gadamer's
83. Id. at 313 n.15.
84. See Mootz, Rule of Law, supra note 26, at 104-05 (discussing Schlag's criticism of
Balkin for co-opting and domesticating the radically decentering activity of deconstruction).
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approach that traditionally have been underemphasized but which
point the way to a more fruitful approach to the problem of ideology
critique in a postmodern world.
III. CRITICAL HERMENEUTICS AND THE RHETORICAL
DEVELOPMENT OF TRADITION: A GADAMERIAN ACCOUNT OF
IDEOLOGY AND CRITIQUE
Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics responds to the fear that
apparently genuine interpretive practices might in fact be masking
power relationships that are maintained by ideology rather than
consensus. This claim is not necessarily at odds with the prevailing
opinion that philosophical hermeneutics precludes effective critical
theory, since the proponents of critical theory generally advocate a
strong conception of theory that Gadamer properly rejects. My
reading of Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics recovers the
experience of critique within interpretive practices and connects this
experience with a theoretical attitude that cannot be sharply
distinguished from practical engagements. 5 My Gadamerian defense
of critical theory begins with an account of the "postmodern self"
who acts as the critic, describing the rhetorical space of critical agency
in the wake of the collapse of the subject-centered philosophical
tradition. I continue by describing the critical practices of this
postmodern self and relate these practices to Gadamer's model of
human understanding. I enlist two skilled guides to assist my effort to
articulate a critical hermeneutics that is grounded in Gadamerian
premises but that presses beyond Gadamer's direct concerns: Calvin
Schrag and P. Christopher Smith.
A.

Locating the Postmodern Self

Balkin struggles to finesse the difficult question of human
agency. On one hand, he argues that cultural software is "in" every
individual, constituting and enabling agency. On the other hand, he
treats the evolution of memes and the operation of the tools of
understanding as distinct topics of study, suggesting that cultural
85. I readily admit that my reading of Gadamer's hermeneutics is not the only plausible
reading, and I make no claim that I have uniquely captured Gadamer's intentions. Such
pretensions obviously would contradict the central teachings of philosophical hermeneutics.
However, I defend my reading of Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics as a charitable
extension of his work that can provide an account of critical theory under postmodern
conditions.
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understandings are structurally defined.
This ambivalence is
compounded by his transcendental argument. On one hand Balkin
seems to suggest that individuals transcend their situation by virtue of
a power within them, but, on the other hand, the transcendent status
of justice appears to be.a dynamism to which individuals are subject.
Consequently, it is unclear how the critic is able to identify and
overcome ideology under Balkin's account. He argues that the critic
must seek out interlocutors to ensure that she avoids ideological
effects in her own thinking, but also that the critic must vigilantly
guard against being co-opted by the other's ideological thinking. In
the end, Balkin is just making the commonsense claim that
individuals act upon their cultural software in reflective ways but that
they do so only through their cultural software. To avoid the
conundrums that Balkin encounters, it is necessary to describe this
reflexive situation in greater detail and with more nuance.
Calvin Schrag's illuminating account of the postmodern self helps
to situate an account of critical theory. Schrag argues that subjectivity
inheres in "communicative praxis," and he locates critical agency in a
"transversal rationality" that is neither pre-given, nor does it
dissemble into postmodern fragmentation. 86 In a recent series of
lectures, Schrag distills his work in an effort "to resituate and refigure
the portrait of the human self," 87 concluding that
In the aftermath of the deconstruction of traditional metaphysics
and epistemology, a new self emerges, like the phoenix arising from
its ashes-a praxis-oriented self, defined by its communicative
practices, oriented toward an understanding of itself in its
discourse, its action, its being with others, and its experience of
transcendence.88
Schrag persuasively describes how this postmetaphysical self is
capable of acting reflectively and has sufficient resources for engaging

86. See CALVIN 0. SCHRAG, COMMUNICATIVE PRAXIS AND THE SPACE OF SUBJECTIVITY
(1986) (hereinafter SCHRAG, COMMUNICATIVE PRAXIS); CALVIN 0. SCHRAG, THE
RESOURCES OF RATIONALITY: A RESPONSE TO THE POSTMODERN CHALLENGE (1992)
(hereinafter SCHRAG, RESOURCES OF RATIONALITY).
87. CALVIN 0. SCHRAG, THE SELF AFTER POSTMODERNITY 8 (1997). This short book is
an edited version of Schrag's 1995 Gilbert Ryle lectures at Trent University. Consequently, it is
wonderfully succinct and suggestive, and it provides a good window into Schrag's philosophy.
88. Id. at 9. Schrag challenges the postmodern tendency to eliminate the "self' as a topic
of discussion:
Although it may be problematic to begin with the subject, either as an epistemological
and self-reflecting subject or as an existentially isolated self, one still has to end with
the subject, duly decentered and refigured.... The subject finds a new space as an
emergent within the dynamics of discursive and institutional practices.
SCHRAG, RESOURCES OF RATIONALITY, supra note 86, at 151.
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in critique, and so I turn to his account as the starting point for my
project of defining a critical hermeneutics.
Schrag contends that the self emerges as an achievement of
discourse, an accomplishment that is "acquired through a transversal
extending over and lying across the multiple forms of speech and
language games without coincidence with any one of them. ' 89 This
dynamic achievement is falsified by the attempt to dissect discourse
into its constituent units, and also by the attempt to cabin discourse
with a structuralist "narratology." 90 Although such studies can yield
knowledge, they inevitably obscure the living discourse in which the
self emerges. 91 Balkin's analysis of the tools of understanding
provides a case in point, inasmuch as his rich descriptions of the tools
tend to obscure the substantial abstraction that is required to
construct distinct "tools" that yield to analysis. Schrag insists that we
cannot confront the fears of postmodernism successfully without
attending to the fact that the postmodern self who criticizes ideology
emerges as a performance within living discourse.
Schrag emphasizes that individuals avoid dissolving into
postmodern fragmentation through a narrative praxis that is
intimately tied to their actions within a social setting. The unity of the
self is not guaranteed by an underlying logic to the forms of discourse,
but rather is a performance that constantly unfolds within a web of
historically conditioned discourses. "The narrating self, as at once a
sediment and a project of discourse, constitutes and understands itself
as emplotted within the interstices of stories already told and stories
yet to be inscribed. '92 Moreover, Schrag emphasizes that discourse is
intimately tied to action-the speaking self is an acting self-and that
actions similarly gain their salience only because they occur within a
historical context. 93 "[T]he acting self is always embedded in social
practices that reclaim a tradition and invoke a remembrance of things
past in anticipation of future practices yet to be performed." 94 Schrag
refigures this speaking and acting self by returning to Aristotle's
Rhetoric. "More like a social practice than a technological tool,
89. SCHRAG, supra note 87, at 33.
90. Id. at 20-22.
91. Id. at 22-23.
92. Id. at 71.
93. Schrag writes: "The placement of individual acts against the background of traditional
and continuing social practices, reinserting them into the ongoing texture of communicative
praxis, has the happy consequence of opening up a vision of the entwinement of discourse and
action in the economy of public life." Id. at 73.
94. Id. at 71.
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rhetoric for Aristotle is the art of persuasion, soliciting deliberation,
choice, and action, oriented toward the projected good for the
polis."95 The postmodern self is a rhetorical being whose persuasive
narratives motivate her actions within a social setting of (more or
less) similarly motivated actors.
Schrag uses the term "communicative praxis" to refer to this
"amalgam of discursive and nondiscursive practices, in which the
meaning-engendering patterns of the spoken and the written word
mix and mingle with meaning-laden actions" to coalesce into the
postmodern self. 96 The crucial point is that deciding to act in a certain

manner can be reasonable and ethical, as opposed to simply arbitrary,
because communicative praxis involves a relinquishment of subjective
control and a rhetorical participation in a shared logos. Schrag
contends that there is an "incarnation of the logos within discourse
and action in a hermeneutic of everyday life. Communicative praxis
announces and displays reason as discourse.... In entering discourse
the logos is decentered and situated within the play of speaker and
hearer as they seek consensus on that which is talked about." 97
Judgments about the "fitting response" to a particular social situation
are rational, then, to the extent that they emerge from the
"responsivity of an engaged and decentered moral self as it responds
to the prior thought and action already inscribed within a historicized
polis"; rationality does not issue from "an interior construct of a
centered and sovereign subject" because no such subject exists. 98 The
rhetorical rationality of communicative praxis is inherently
communal.
To this point Schrag's account closely tracks Gadamer's
hermeneutical argument that truth inheres in the playful reconstitution of tradition and that it is not the product of methodological
abstraction. However, Schrag argues that the communicative praxis
of rhetorical actors engenders a critical distance that too often is
suppressed in Gadamer's account. Schrag begins by locating the self
in a "community" that "is more than customs and conventions of the
tradition," and is "more like the binding textuality of our discourse
and the integrating purpose of our action." 99 The speaking and acting
95. Id. at 75 (discussing ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC, reprinted in THE BASIC WORKS OF
ARISTOTLE 1325 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941)).
96. SCHRAG, COMMUNICATIVE PRAXIS, supra note 86, at vii.
97. Id. at 193.
98. SCHRAG, RESOURCES OF RATIONALITY, supra note 86, at 175-76.

99. SCHRAG, supra note 87, at 87.
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subject is not just situated among other speaking and acting subjects;
the self is a performance that emerges only by virtue of its responses
to communal practices. 1°° This responsiveness includes a "moment of
critical agency" that Schrag does not find in Gadamer's account of the
development of a tradition, because the response to a communal
logos is "not simply to accommodate oneself to that which is going
on. It involves discernment, evaluation, [and] critical judgment," a
pretheoretical and precognitive activity that Schrag terms "praxial
critique." 101 The essence of praxial critique is that it is simultaneously
an articulation and application of the criteria of judgment within a
shifting historical horizon, and so rationality is seen as a performative
construction rather than adherence to preexistence criteria. 1°2
I contend that Schrag's approach is wholly consistent with, and
anticipated by, Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. It is easy
enough to recast Gadamer's central insight-to understand is always
to understand differently-by using Schrag's terminology: all
understanding involves discernment, which is an activity that always
includes a degree of critical distanciation. Schrag elaborates this
insight in great detail, though, demonstrating how Gadamer's
ontological commitments implicate a critical agency. Schrag agrees
with Gadamer that discernment emerges from prejudgments within a
traditionary horizon, but he emphasizes that there can be
no discernment apart from a placing of these prejudgments, habits
of thought, and action into question. The activation of such
questioning requires the performance of distanciation, a stepping-

100. Schrag's analysis closely tracks Gadamer's description of the priority of the question
and the hermeneutical significance of the other.
[T]he discourse and action that play such prominent roles in the process of selfformation are always a discourse and action responding to prior discourse and prior
action. Hence the parameters for any socialization of the self have already been
marked out. Within these parameters the self never begins itself; it finds itself to be
always already begun. And it is always already begun by virtue of its responsivity to
the speech and actions of others.
Id. at 91. This is a crucial aspect of Gadamer's genuine postmodern insights in the face of
sophistic uses of postmodern themes. "Although we are sympathetic with the postmodern
problematization of subject-centered philosophy, we are concerned about the failure of nerve in
postmodernism to acknowledge the weight of tradition and the background of communicative
practices against which the subject assumes a new posture." SCHRAG, RESOURCES OF
RATIONALITY, supra note 86, at 151.
101. SCHRAG, supra note 87, at 99. For Schrag's analysis of rationality as praxial critique,
see SCHRAG, RESOURCES OF RATIONALITY, supra note 86, at 50-67.
102. Schrag quite explicitly embraces a historical and nonfoundational description of
critique. "Critique, refigured as praxialcritique, enjoys neither modernity's zeal for foundations
nor its hopes for the attainment of certainty. It rests content to discern and assess the play of
forms of thought and action against the background of changing and historically conditioned
patterns of signification." SCHRAG, RESOURCES OF RATIONALITY, supra note 86, at 57.
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back, as it were, to discern what it is that has been going on behind
our backs. It is this performance of distanciation that provides the
distinctively "critical" moment of rationality as praxial critique. 03
Schrag is equally interested in challenging the excesses of
postmodernism, and toward this end he insists that distanciation does
not inevitably disintegrate into a bottomless and contextless
negativity for the simple reason that critical distance is a product of
social engagement and therefore presupposes community. The
traditional picture of a solitary inquirer gaining a critical perspective
on social practices by extricating herself from them is replaced by a
reconceptualization of critical agency as a space that is opened only
by virtue of preexisting social engagement.
"The background
solicitations of mutual understanding and solidarity in communal
endeavors, inscribed within the participatory relationship, remain
dialectically bonded with the assertion of self in the distanciating
'
performance."104
Aligning himself with Gadamer, Schrag agrees that
critical distanciation can never be completely severed from
participatory belonging. But Schrag challenges Gadamer's biases by
insisting that it must also follow that participatory belonging can
never be insulated from critical distanciation.
Schrag explains this inevitable commingling of critique and
belonging by elaborating Gadamer's recovery of the classical
rhetorical tradition that persisted until Vico's spirited last stand
against the Cartesian paradigm. 105 Rhetoric has become devalued as
merely a strategic tool employed by a speaker upon an audience, but
the classical tradition also emphasized the rhetorical engagements
that structure an active field of persuasion and action. "The engaged
rhetor and audience deploy their own inscriptions of sense and
reference, and maneuver their own interventions, albeit not from the
vantage point of founding and originating principles but rather from
the perspective of involvement and responsiveness across a landscape
of we-relationships."1 °6 Rhetoric is the site of discernment, judgment,
persuasion, and action, in which selves come to understand and act
only by virtue of the provocations of their heterogeneous community.
Rhetoric always involves a critical element, because these

103. Id. at 64 (drawing from Ricoeur's work on the dialectic of participation and
distanciation in interpretive encounters).
104. Id. at 67.
105. See id. at 121-22.
106. Id. at 131.
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provocations pose questions that push the individual beyond received
wisdom and into rhetorical inventiveness.
The turn to rhetoric emphasizes the intricate coexistence of
dissensus and consensus. Rationality hesitantly emerges from within
conflicting discourses and patterns of actions as a transversal
connection that immediately is thrown into question again.
Gadamer's emphasis on the background agreements subtending
disagreements is best read in this light: he does not reach for
substantive points of agreement that always remain unquestioned, but
rather recognizes an "agreement" in the form of a communal
engagement that lies transversally across disparate discourses and
practices. Schrag explains:
Reason remains transversal to the various forms of our personal
and social forms of life. It lies across them diagonally; it is neither
vertically transcendent to them nor horizontally immanent within
them. It operates "between" them in such a manner that it is able
to critique, articulate, and disclose them without achieving a
coincidence with any particular form of discourse, thought, or
action. The integrity of otherness-other forms of thought and
other social practices-is maintained, accomplishing at once a
better understanding of that which is one's own and a recognition
of the need to make accommodations and adjustments in the
response to the presence of that which is other. Within such a
scheme of things, the dynamics of transversal rationality falls out as
a convergence without coincidence, an interplay without synthesis,
an appropriation without totalization, and a unification that allows
for difference. Such is the transversal dynamics that motivates
rationality as a concernful struggle within communicative praxis. 107
Rhetorical engagement is the plying of this transversal rationality in
discourse and action within the historical context of a community.
My extended consideration of Schrag's defense of communicative praxis serves two purposes. First, the project of critical
theory requires a critic, and so it is necessary to give an account of the
situated self who will be charged with engaging in critique. Schrag
connects Gadamer's ontology to a refigured "postmodern self" whose
very social existence implies a critical distanciation. But this tells only
half of the story. Second, there must also be a connection between
this refigured postmodern self and the project of critique. Schrag
concludes that the pretheoretical critical distanciation of discernment
provides sufficient motivation to underwrite the later critical projects
consciously undertaken by the self as critic.

107. Id. at 158-59.
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Both intracultural and transcultural judgments and assessments
retain their efficacy. Indeed, such judgments and assessments are
unavoidable given the transversal play of our beliefs and practices
in responding to that which is said and done. It is precisely through
this response-dynamics of communicative praxis, whereby we
respond to the discourse and action that is thrust upon us, that the
deployment of critique, articulation, and disclosure proceeds. 108

Transversal rationality is responsive to historical context and never
issues from universal presuppositions, but because it operates across
different discourses, disciplines, and contexts, it is never trapped
within particular contingencies. It is the constant provocation of
"otherness" that situates reason outside of a closed context, even if it
always is context-dependent. 10 9
B.

Critique As Belonging: OriginalArgument and the Theoretical
Posture of Not-Knowing

Schrag concludes that communicative praxis includes an element
of transcendence that enables the postmodern subject to gain a
critical perspective." 0 Inspired by Kierkegaard,111 Schrag's approach
is far more satisfactory than Balkin's transcendental turn.
Nevertheless, it is more productive to avoid the language of
transcendence altogether even while attending to the "transcending"
effect of being brought outside one's forestructure of prejudices in a
hermeneutical encounter with another person." 2 Following the
radical elements in the hermeneutical tradition of Heidegger and

108. Id. at 169.
109. Id. at 173.
110. See SCHRAG, supra note 87, at 110-48 (chapter 4, entitled "The Self in Transcendence").
111. See id. at 117-18.
112. Schrag argues that the social dimension of language and action results in a surplus of
practices as against any temporal and contextual articulation. Schrag argues that transcendence
is embedded within culturally sedimented practices by virtue of this surplus, but that our
transversal rationality frees us from the confines of a particular scientific, aesthetic, or ethicalpractical forms of discourse. He argues that "the integrity of the historically specific discourse
and action in each of the spheres is safeguarded by a radical transcendence, a horizon of
otherness, an alterity of possibilities, that provides a sheet anchor against any cultural
hegemony, be it that of scientism, moralism, aestheticism, or ecclesiasticism." SCHRAG, supra
note 87, at 133. Schrag emphasizes that transcendence doesn't secure univocity, but instead
simply opens a critical distance from current practices within which we can engage in dialogue
with others, "striving for convergence without coincidence, conjuncture without concordance,
seeking to understand within the context of differences."
Id. at 148; see supra text
accompanying note 107 (emphasizing that transversal rationality is not vertically transcendent
to various forms of life, but rather lies "between" them). I will avoid potential misunderstandings of his approach, and potential pitfalls, by concentrating on the experience of alterity
that lies at the root of his notion of transcendence.
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Gadamer, Christopher Smith outlines just such an approach by
concentrating on hermeneutical experience rather than hermeneutical
philosophy. Smith argues that Heidegger's early essay, Ontology:
Hermeneutics of Facticity, recuperates Aristotle's notion of
hermeneutics as talking matters through as opposed to a method of
textual exegesis, and that Gadamer radicalizes this notion in a
manner that overcomes Heidegger's later distrust of the
"everydayness" of dialogue.113
Smith characterizes this radical
hermeneutical experience as "original argument," signaling that this
fundamentally social experience is contested, or argumentative, in
some manner. By recovering the experience of original argument,
Smith illuminates the critical space that Schrag identifies with
transversal rationality. Significantly, Smith does so without reverting
to any manner of transcendental argument.
Smith seeks to uncover the original experience of argument that
occurs in consultation and deliberation with another person, as
opposed to the univocal and demonstrative model of argumentation
that characterizes modern "reasoning." Contemporary accounts of
reason present a picture of a self that formulates a position that later
is converted to speech for the purpose of compelling another person's
assent by demonstrating its unquestionable validity. 114 In contrast,
Smith emphasizes that the original experience of hearing another
person within a shared language involves both a physical and
cognitive response: the child hears the parent's rebuke and feels it,
rather than simply processes it."' Our thinking assent to a proposition
that another person demonstrates to be true is always derivative of
our participation in a shared language, because "we never think in
wordless ideas, but only in the words we have first heard from others
and then hear again in our thinking.' 16 Demonstrating that one has
"seen" something that another should also "see" is always an

113. See P. CHRISTOPHER SMITH, THE HERMENEUTICS OF ORIGINAL ARGUMENT:
DEMONSTRATION, DIALECTIC, RHETORIC 13-34 (1998) (discussing MARTIN HEIDEGGER,
ONTOLOGY: THE HERMENEUTICS OF FAcTrICITY (John Van Buren trans., Ind. Univ. Press
1999) (1988)). Smith argues that Heidegger fails to pursue the project anticipated in his early
lecture, id. at 312 n.5, and throughout the book he repeatedly invokes Gadamer's focus on the
social realm of everyday speech as an antidote to Heidegger's elitist, monological quest to
apprehend truth through poetry.
114. P. Christopher Smith, The Uses of Aristotle in Gadamer's Recovery of Consultative
Reasoning: Sunesis, Sungn6m , Epieikeia, and Sumbouleuesthai, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 731,
731 (2000).
115. SMITH,supra note 113, at 219-20.
116. Smith, supra note 114, at 740.
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abstraction from an original being-with-another-in-language in which
two people "hear" each other in deliberation.
In other words, language, audible speech, is not invented by private
individuals to signify thoughts they already have but is the gift of
the community that allows the individual to think in the first place.
Not cogito ergo sum ["I think, therefore I am"] is the truth of the
matter, rather loquimur ergo cogito ["We speak, therefore I
think"],' 7
This originary hermeneutical bond is argumentative, though, because
it does not simply involve the passive reception of a "message."
Instead, two persons in consultation experience and adjust to each
other, and it is this tension and adjustment that is the source of critical
understanding.
Original argument occurs in the hermeneutical-rhetorical realm
of communicative praxis and is defined by three characteristics: (1) it
consists of reasoning through use of topics or commonplaces in a
naturally flowing conversation; (2) it concerns "contingent, temporal,
ever self-contradictory things and comes, accordingly, only to
likelihoods and inconclusive 'conclusions"'; and (3) it is voiced and
heard in natural language. 118 Platonic argument covers over this
original experience of deliberating together by privileging the narrow
subset of demonstrative argument. Demonstrative argument involves
the application of logic to concepts defined by symbolic language; it is
an argumentative style that strives for the certainty of mathematics.
Smith recognizes that Plato was attempting to answer the perceived
threat of sophistic manipulation. He concludes, however, that by
demanding such high standards of rationality Plato in fact facilitated
our current state of affairs, which is defined by interminable partisan
bickering over matters of politics and ethics.11 9 Smith's project is to
read Aristotle's Rhetoric and other ancient texts destructively in
order to uncover how original argument occurs in communication
117. Id. at 735.
118. SMITH, supra note 113, at 4.
119. Id. at 10-11 (concluding that the impossibility of meeting Platonic requirements means
that "apparent rationality and pseudo-demonstrative 'logic' only blind us to the irrational horror
of it all"). Smith emphasizes this point in clear and succinct terms:
And if, having seen that in mathematical science demonstration effectively wards off
sophism, one were then to seek to argue demonstratively about these ethical and
political matters, one would, we have seen, in fact only open the door to sophistical
deception. For sophists can argue for their own advantage most persuasively precisely
by disguising their own arguments as objective demonstrations grounded in intuitively
certain first principles and by thus concealing these arguments' real ground in the
speaker's Pthos, his or her life "choice" of self-aggrandizement, and in his or her
disingenuous manipulation of the affects.
Id. at 217.
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that takes place on a heart-to-heart, visceral level that grips the
120
listener in a psychosomatic manner.
In many ways, legal practice exemplifies the nearly complete

subordination of original argument to the encrustation of demonstrative reasoning. As one commentator accurately summarizes, "the
particular rhetoric that law embraces is the rhetoric of foundations
and logical deductions... [and] is one that relies, above all else, upon

the denial that it is rhetoric that is being done. ' 121 Similarly, Smith
concludes that "judicial reasoning... has effectively displaced and
buried the original ways we exist and talk with each other in availing
ourselves of the words said from time out of mind that we have first
heard from others.' '22 The play of original argument, in the
communicative praxis of two persons taking counsel with each other,
lies hidden behind the assertive mode of demonstrative argument that

appears to define the work of lawyers and judges. The rhetorical and
affective dimensions of legal argumentation are wholly repressed.

It may not be immediately clear how an examination
communicative praxis and original argument help to clarify
problem of ideology critique. Smith emphasizes that there
"important, challenging consequences" if we acknowledge that
demonstrative

argumentation

exemplified

in

legal

practice

of
the
are
the
is

predicated on a form of reasoning that "originates in our belonging
together... in a community of reasoners.' 23 However, Smith does
not expressly describe the consequences of his radical challenge to
demonstrative reasoning, nor does he claim to achieve anything other
than providing a more accurate description of reasoning by
recuperating the hermeneutics of original argument. 124 My claim is

that Smith and Schrag are important windows not only to the
120. See id. at 217-90 (chapter 6, entitled "Embodied Argument as Patho/logical: The
Original Fusion of Pathos and Logos"). Smith persuasively rejects Derrida's claim that texts
have priority over oral communications in uncovering hermeneutical experience. See id. at 13456.
121. Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal Discourse, 76 VA. L. REV. 1545,
1555 (1990).
122. Smith, supranote 114, at 749.
123. Id. at 748.
124. Smith ends his book with an acknowledgment that he has made the case for a
hermeneutical retrieval of the aural dimensions of original argument only by means of a written
text that employs demonstrative argumentation. SMITH, supra note 113, at 310. As a result, his
demonstration of the "true" character of our being-with-others ironically tends to undermine his
thesis. Perhaps it is this irony that keeps Smith from pressing the conclusions of his research,
since such an effort would particularly threaten to devolve into demonstrative argument. In
what follows I hope to "demonstrate" that the critic must abandon the demonstrative
argumentation of a strong conception of critical theory. My strategy is to embrace the irony.
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experience of understanding-what Balkin prosaically terms an
"economy of exchange"-but also to the critical agency that is
enabled by this experience.
Balkin mistakenly limits the experience of understanding by
investing the self-as-critic with the duty to manage the hermeneutical
experience of understanding through careful selection of the
influences that she will suffer. To avoid the ego-centric conclusions
that follow from his narrow reading of hermeneutical experience,
Balkin then embraces a transcendental argument that attempts to
explain the subject's never-ceasing embrace of new experience as a
result of the lack of complete self-possession. Balkin's project,
although quite promising in its descriptive stages, ultimately does
violence to his own presuppositions in order to provide an account of
In contrast, Schrag and Smith begin with
ideology critique.
satisfactory
account of human understanding, and
Gadamer's more
then develop this account in ways that open the space for a
hermeneutical account of critical legal theory.
Schrag connects the inherent responsiveness of the "postmodern
self" - reconceived as a performance within communal practices - to

the critical agency that results from a transversal rationality that lies
across historically conditioned discourses. Smith links the postmodern self to the hermeneutics of original argument, in which
another person is "heard" in a way that changes the listener as
opposed to changing only the listener's mind.125 Smith provides a
historical account of the ambivalence in Plato and Aristotle as they
covered over the Homeric tradition and set the course for modern
"rationality," but once his persuasive recovery of original argument is
complete there is an additional and crucial point to be drawn. The
critical agency of the postmodern self is found in the experience of
original argument, in which one's insularity is disrupted and
continually reconfigured.
In his exchange with Habermas, Gadamer steadfastly refused to
surrender to the theoretical urge to demarcate a critical rationality
But Gadamer's
that looked behind hermeneutic experience.
125. Smith explains:
Thus, what someone undergoes in embodied argument and rhetoric is much more than
a change of mind from dissent to assent, from "I don't see it that way" to "I do." On
the contrary, it is a change of heart, a change in how one feels about something, which
is to say, a "gut" change sometimes even from rebellious refusal to consent, from
"Over my dead body!" to "Yes, I will." This response is not just intellectual. On the
contrary, such hearing is in a fundamental sense visceral.
Id. at 220.
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ontological stance does not discount the lesson that I draw from my
reading of Schrag and Smith: critical rationality inheres within
hermeneutic experience. Hermeneutic experience is never passive
reception, nor is it orchestrated by an individual who methodologically directs her own understanding. Hermeneutic experience
involves friction; it is not a dance that glides effortlessly. Rather than
a choreographed scene with Fred Astair and Ginger Rogers,
hermeneutic experience is more akin to the collective experience, or
fusion of horizons, in a mosh pit. Against the deep and rich
background of communal understandings and practices, two persons
in consultation with each other experience a disruption and challenge.
If hermeneutic experience did not generate critical distance, it is
difficult to understand how we could even perceive another person as
"other." In front of the "other" person (or text, or practice), we
continually are brought up short and thrown into a transversal
rationality that operates without secure foundations that can be
elaborated solely by logical implications. Transversal rationality is
the activity of operating between and across localized discourses and
practices, and therefore involves some measure of critical distance
from particular contexts. The important point is that this critical
distance, this friction, this intermingling of consensus and dissensus, is
always a product of hermeneutic experience.
An example might clarify this point. The intense partnership of a
successful marital or life-partner relationship provides a model of the
operation of human understanding. Within such a relationship two
persons undoubtedly experience a fusion of horizons, and together
they develop a shared background through time that subtends present
experience as an abiding "agreement." But Gadamer's analysis does
not capture the full depth of such a relationship if it ends with a rosy,
Hollywood picture of a complete and timeless fusion of horizons. In
my experience, parties to an intense, lifelong relationship find that
their individuality is heightened when they are with their partner.
Communicative praxis does not flatten individuality into an
undifferentiated shared existence; instead, a deeply relational
existence provides a sense that one's "self" is uniquely realized
precisely because one is so deeply entwined with another. This reality
is the lifeblood of classic situation comedies, in which spousal
relationships exhibit a constitutive "oneness" even as each person is
revealed as (a humorously idiosyncratic) individual. As an exemplar
of hermeneutical experience, life-partner relationships demonstrate
that a hermeneutical experience resulting in a fusion of horizons
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imports within it a critical distance that provides perspective on
oneself and the world. I expect that most people regard their lifepartner relationship as beneficial for this very reason: it is the means
by which they become the best person possible just because they gain
perspective on themselves (and the world) by virtue of their
relationship with another.
It is only when interacting with a
superficial and casual acquaintance that the "everydayness" of the
experience tends to leave no imprint on oneself, for it is the lack of a
full-bodied hermeneutical experience that leaves one's sense of self (a
prejudiced forestructure) unchallenged.
Having recovered the critical dimension of hermeneutical
experience, it is now abundantly clear that Balkin's "transcendental
move" is not just unnecessary to account for critique, it is also
misleading. To this point, the discussion has focused on hermeneutical experience, or what Gadamer would term the phenomenology of human understanding. The problems with Balkin's
transcendental account are made even clearer by shifting attention
from describing the dynamics of understanding to providing an
account of critical theory.
Balkin expressly acknowledges the
reflexive character of critical theory, but his transcendental turn
empties his recognition of any radical significance. Balkin's critic, as
an analyst wary of being hermeneutically co-opted, is driven by an
"inexhaustible urge" to define justice; she does not find her
motivation within hermeneutical encounters. Indeed, it is her urge
toward justice that keeps her from wholly surrendering herself to
hermeneutical encounters. By positing a transcendental source of the
critic's motivation, Balkin effectively exempts the critic from analysis
by leaving it to the critic, now invested with the qualities of a
relatively robust subjectivity, to monitor her hermeneutical
experience.
Beginning with a Gadamerian account of understanding, and
adopting the elaborations proposed by Schrag and Smith, I propose a
new account of ideology critique.
Balkin's characterization of
ideology is correct: ideology is not the result of defective modes of
understanding, it is a normative assessment of the unacceptable
results flowing from certain understandings. Philosophical hermeneutics suggests a very different role for the critical theorist, however,
and in doing so provides an alternative to Balkin's unsatisfactory
transcendental turn. Because critique is a feature of hermeneutical
experience, it is appropriate to view the critic of ideology as one who
can foster this experience and overcome the superficiality that defines
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too many encounters in contemporary life. Critical theory, under this
view, is the facilitation of a suppressed feature of hermeneutical
experience. The critic does not employ a special methodology that
stands outside ordinary hermeneutical encounters. Instead, the critic
adopts a distinct posture within hermeneutical encounters that
maximizes the critical element already present in these encounters.
In a recent article, I have explained this approach in greater
detail by using the practice of postmodern psychotherapists as a
model for critical legal theory. 126 Postmodern psychotherapy provides
a model for critical legal theorists because it is a theoretically
informed hermeneutical activity; the therapist adopts a theoretical
posture to assist her client, but she does not pretend to stand outside
her hermeneutical engagement with the client in dialogue.
Postmodern psychotherapists disavow the traditional conception of
psychoanalysis as a comprehensive theory that permits the "expert"
analyst to "see through" the patient's neuroses. Instead, they adopt a
philosophical position of "not-knowing."
Postmodern psychotherapists locate the critical dimension of therapy in a collaborative
dialogue with the client rather than claiming the authority to artfully
direct the client's review of life options from the therapist's presumed
position of superiority. Under their account, the therapist is an
expert in facilitating the patient's attempts to fashion a satisfactory
life narrative, rather than an expert in diagnosing what is wrong with
the patient according to a theoretically derived template.
Postmodern psychotherapists regard therapeutic dialogue as a
hermeneutical, rhetorical, and narrative experience that exploits the
critical element of all dialogue. Changing the focus from uncovering
psychic reality by means of a theory to engaging a client in a
productive dialogue, postmodern therapists characterize their
practice as helping the client to interpret her situation and then
deliberating with the client about the possibilities for change. As
interpretation and persuasion, postmodern psychotherapy is not just a
collection of techniques wielded by an expert for the purpose of
"creating" mental health. Psychotherapeutic dialogue explores the
client's situation and illuminates the resources available for
overcoming perceived inadequacies, working from an understanding
that life is narratively structured. The therapist enters into dialogue
126. Francis J. Mootz III, Psychotherapeutic Practice As a Model for Postmodern Legal
Theory, 12 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 299 (2000). My description of this model in the text that
follows is an overview of the detailed argument that I present in the above article, to which I
refer the reader who seeks elaboration and citations to the literature.
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with the client to hear a troubled narrative and to lend her assistance
to the client's efforts to revise the narrative. Because the client's
prenarrative experience permits a range of narrative constructions
rather than just a single accurate representation, therapy is always a
contextualized and pragmatic assessment in which the therapist acts
as a facilitator of the client's narrative revisions.
Postmodern therapists employ critical theory in a unique
manner. Their goal is not to establish a template of mental health
that they can place over client narratives; rather, they theorize about
how to foster a genuine dialogue with their clients, because critical
insight is only gained within such a dialogue. Clients require
assistance in recognizing that their life narratives have become unduly
rigid, usually because they have inappropriately extrapolated one
mode of responding to particular situations (e.g., anger) to a more
generalized mode of being (e.g., depression). The therapist's goal is
to establish equilibrium in the client's life by fostering a dialogue in
which the client experiences the false sense of necessity and rigidity
that defines the client's life. Psychotherapy is a process in which the
therapist and client together uncover options in the client's life by
exposing the contingent and multivalent character of socially
constructed narratives that the client had formerly regarded as
inflexible and given. The important point is that postmodern
psychotherapeutic practice is oriented toward facilitating this
dialogue rather than charting the "correct" narrative that will "cure"
the patient.
Gadamer's hermeneutical philosophy embraces the critical
theory of "not-knowing" that postmodern psychotherapists espouse.
In The Enigma of Health,127 Gadamer argues that the practice of
psychotherapy exemplifies the hermeneutical nature of medical
practice. Although psychotherapeutic dialogue often is disparaged as
a set of verbal techniques that cannot match the efficacy of
psychopharmacological cures, Gadamer contends that this specialized
form of discourse in fact embodies the inescapable hermeneutical
nature of the healing arts.128 Gadamer famously argued against
Habermas's psychoanalytic model of critical social theory,129 but he
acknowledges that psychotherapeutic dialogue, as understood by
127. HANS-GEORG GADAMER: THE ENIGMA OF HEALTH: THE ART OF HEALING IN A
SCIENTIFIC AGE (Jason Gaiger & Nicholas Walker trans., Stanford Univ. Press 1996) (1993).

128. See id. at 77.
129. For my review of the Gadamer-Habermas debate, see Mootz, supra note 126, at 306-41;
Mootz, Ontological Basis, supra note 26, at 568-96.
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many postmodern psychotherapists, provides a model of the critical
element of hermeneutical experience. 130 This distinction is best
explained by concluding that Gadamer criticizes the Freudian
conception of psychoanalysis as a theoretically guided method of
revealing the patient's true psychological state, but that he
acknowledges the significance of psychotherapeutic dialogue carried
out within a hermeneutic engagement, however fragile and tentative,
between therapist and patient.
Schrag and Smith expand Gadamer's philosophy in a way that
connects with this psychotherapeutic model of critical theory. The
ability of transversal rationality to open the space for critique is
precisely what is impaired in the person who seeks psychotherapy,
and so it is possible to construe the practice of psychotherapy as a
practical reconstruction of transversal rationality by overcoming
narrative rigidity. Moreover, postmodern psychotherapy exemplifies
the hermeneutics of original argument in practice, since the therapist
"hears" the client's narrative and then deliberates with the client
rather than attempting to "demonstrate" the path to a "cure." When
postmodern psychotherapists theorize about their practice, then, they
are modeling what it means to do critical theory if one accepts
Gadamer's ontology of human understanding.
My psychotherapeutic model of critical theory stands in sharp
contrast to Balkin's subject-centered critical approach. Although
purporting to disavow traditional conceptions of critique, Balkin
repeatedly describes the critic as an "analyst" who engages in
dialogue with an "analysand" in order to expose the analysand's
ideological effects. Wary of the obvious implications of using such
scientistic language, Balkin emphasizes that ideological analysis is
akin to a "narrative reconstruction" in which the analyst acknowledges that she does not have access to a unitary "correct" narrative
for the analysand, and she characterizes her work with the analysand
as fashioning a new narrative within a plural universe."' Balkin keeps
the critic in the driver's seat, though, even if he recognizes that there
are multiple routes to arriving at the goal of securing autonomy for
the analysand. The critic stands apart from the patient, and it is only
by virtue of doing so that she generates a critical perspective on the
patient's condition.
The psychotherapeutic model of critical legal theory yields
130. See GADAMER, supra note 127, at 163-73.
131. See BALKIN, supra note 2, at 201-03.
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important insights into the nature of critique. If a legal theorist is
persuaded that the philosophical stance of "not-knowing" will
facilitate her critical practice to the greatest degree possible, what
further guidance does the psychotherapeutic model provide for her
critical activity? I believe that the model redefines the theorist's
project in terms of two general, and related, goals: first, the critical
theorist should disrupt rigid narrative constructions that are proving
problematic to the client; second, the critical theorist should expose
how particular responses have been unsatisfactorily abstracted from
discrete situations into a more generalized mode of being. In the
psychotherapeutic context these goals are pursued by carefully
attending to the client's story and engaging in dialogue oriented
toward expanding the client's (and the therapist's) narratively
structured mode of existence. By adopting this practice as a model of
critical legal theory, I propose to extend these defining features to the
different context of legal critique.
Modeling critical legal theory on these features of
psychotherapeutic practice appears problematic because there is no
presenting client seeking the assistance of the therapist. But this
difference underscores the very point of applying the model: critical
legal theorists must regard the legal tradition as a "presenting client."
The legal tradition speaks no less than an individual client; the legal
tradition is nothing more than the accumulated voices of individuals
that have been rendered into texts that have a history of continuing
effects. A psychotherapeutic model of critical legal theory rejects the
idea that "law" is a concept awaiting explication in favor of the view
that law is a narratively structured social process. The participants in
legal practice present their anxieties no less than an individual
entering psychotherapy. The model counsels the critical legal theorist
to attend to the "presenting" rather than forcing a theoretically
derived template over the legal tradition. The critical legal theorist
must take lawyers and judges struggling with practical problems
seriously, rather than regarding them as self-deluding simpletons who
must be diagnosed rather than dialogically engaged.
The critical legal theorist can disrupt unproductive abstractions
and the sense of false necessity within legal discourse only by means
of a hermeneutical-rhetorical engagement that seeks to recover a
broader, narratively structured sense of unity from within a situation
of apparent contraries that are manifested in the practice. The
theorist has no recourse to, nor any need for, an external standard of
critique against which practices can be assessed, because the critical
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project involves an identification and opening of possibilities within
the narratively structured social realm of law. In other words, the
goal of critical legal theory is not to develop an ideal legal narrative
and then to import it into practice, but rather to demonstrate the
malleability of narrative reality to participants in the practice in order
to promote the possibility of overcoming unhelpful, static conventions
and to open the possibility for more satisfactory participation in the
ongoing process of creating and transforming legal meaning. The
psychotherapeutic model counsels the critical legal theorist to engage
in this dialogue like a postmodern psychotherapist: not by attempting
to preserve a distinct and superior theoretical knowledge of the client,
and yet also not like a friend (or adversary) wholly engaged in
ordinary conversation (or legal argumentation). The theoretical
posture of "not-knowing" 13 2 describes the goal of a critical theorist
working within a hermeneutical experience to maximize critical
insight.
The psychotherapeutic model is not just a technique, but rather
speaks to the personal qualities of the critic. The critical legal theorist
must undertake a critical project with the curiosity and flexibility that
will permit the tradition to speak more fully, since a theoretically
informed methodology for reconceptualizing the tradition will only
further contribute to the narrow rigidity that is the principal target of
critique. Critical legal theorists must be ready to suspend premature
judgment in favor of a cooperative effort to define reasonable
resolutions, must refuse to hide behind theoretical abstraction and
engage in the plural universe that they seek to reveal, and must
accept responsibility for the fact that their activity is more ethical than
it is cognitive. This approach to the critique of ideology remains
faithful to Gadamer's description of human understanding, but it is
not a comforting assurance that "critique just happens." My psychotherapeutic model of critical theory poses a substantial challenge for
critical legal theorists who are far more disposed to adopt an "allknowing" theoretical posture, since it demands that they put
themselves at risk in hermeneutic experience. Gadamer emphasizes
this challenge by claiming that
hermeneutic philosophy understands itself not as an absolute
position but as a way of experience. It insists that there is no higher
principle than holding oneself open in a conversation. But this
means: Always recognize in advance the possible correctness, even
the superiority of the conversation partner's position. Is this too
132. See Mootz, supra note 126, at 366-72.
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little? Indeed, this seems to me to be the kind of integrity one can
demand only of a professor of philosophy. And one should
demand as much.133
Critical legal theorists must abandon the easy route of pursuing a
strong conception of theory and must embrace the risky play of
transversal rationality in original argument.
Critical theory is not an expression of a deep-seated personal
urge toward justice that emerges from "the wellsprings of the human
soul," 134 as Balkin would have it. Rather, critical theory is the practice
of maximizing the critical distance that occurs only within
hermeneutical engagements. Critique is always a social experience,
and critical theory is just a reflection on facilitating this social
experience. Following the model of postmodern psychotherapists,
critical legal theorists are best counseled to abandon the effort to
demonstrate the answers to social problems and to attend much more
to hearing the questions posed within the tradition and then
deliberating about these questions with others.
CONCLUSION

Balkin defines the problem of critical theory in the postmodern
age with great skill, but his transcendental response reflects a failure
of nerve. Philosophical hermeneutics provides an account of the
ontology of human understanding that leaves sufficient room for the
experience of critique and the project of critical theory. By rereading
Gadamer in response to the problems posed by Balkin's work we can
uncover the subtle connections between understanding and critique,
belonging and distanciation. Critical theory and interpretation
emerge not as contestants in an age-old battle; rather, they emerge as
features of what Gadamer broadly terms our hermeneutic situation.
Philosophical hermeneutics opens a pathway for refusing to take the
transcendental turn in the face of the postmodern challenge but
without surrendering the aspirations of emancipatory critique with
nihilistic resignation. Whether critics will be able to meet the ethical,
cognitive, and affective demands of putting themselves at risk in a
manner designed to maximize the critical dimension of hermeneutic
experience is, of course, the real question.

133. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, On the Origins of Philosophical Hermeneutics, in PHILOSOPHICAL APPRENTICESHIPS 177, 189 (Robert R. Sullivan trans., MIT Press 1985) (1977).
134. Balkin, supra note 67, at 1139.

